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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you represent a corporate debtor in a United States chapter 11
proceeding. A creditor files a large claim, one of the largest in the case. The
claim calls for payments to be made far into the future. The court concludes
the debtor is liable and instructs the parties to brief the appropriate measure
of damages. Finance 101 tells you that the quantum of damages for future
payments will depend on the discount rate, i.e. the assumed rate of interest
applied to discount the future payments to present value. Indeed, bankruptcy
courts are regularly called upon to determine discount rates for future cash
flows.1 You advocate for a reasonable discount rate, one that accurately
reflects market conditions and properly captures the harm claimed. You
might point to treasury yields or average stock market returns, but you focus
on the actual damage suffered and how to best calculate the value of that
damage over time. Your adversary, however, claims the unilateral right to
define its own discount rate, and, moreover, states flatly that this rate need
not be supported by any evidence, is beyond debate, and cannot be
questioned by the court. Imagine further that your opponent proposes a
discount rate that yields a claim that is twice, three times, or even 25 times
the amount that would be calculated using a discount rate implied by actual
market conditions – leading to a claim far in excess of the damage actually
suffered by the creditor. Finally, suspend disbelief and assume that the court
agrees with your adversary. Your debtor faces an outsized claim, and other
creditors holding admitted claims – creditors whose claims have been
determined in the traditional fashion focusing on the damage actually
1. See generally Gregory M. Gordon et. al., Present Value Discounting of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 33 (2008) (citing as examples, in addition to
claims by the PBGC, claims under unexpired leases and executory contracts and for rejection
damages or prepetition breaches, claims by employees and retirees, claims under long-term
debt instruments and related guaranties, and mass tort claims).
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suffered – have their recoveries substantially diluted.
This is not a far-fetched hypothetical. This real-life scenario regularly
confronts debtors facing claims filed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (“PBGC”), the federal agency charged with administering the
insurance program for U.S. private-sector, defined-benefit pension plans
protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”).2 In the event of a termination of such a pension plan, the PBGC
takes control of the pension plan’s assets and is responsible to make
payments to the pensioners covered by the plan subject to a statutory cap.3
As a result, the PBGC is empowered by statute to bring a claim against the
sponsor of the terminated pension plan for any shortfall between the value
of the plan assets transferred to the PBGC and the expected future benefit
payments payable to pensioners, known as unfunded benefit liabilities
(“UBL”) under ERISA.4 Since pension benefits are by their nature paid out
over time and are contingent on factors such as mortality and retirement, the
PBGC’s UBL claim must be estimated in order to be recovered, and, once
estimated, an interest rate must be applied to those future payments to
discount them to present value. Unlike other creditors seeking recovery for
future payment streams, however, the PBGC maintains that it has the right
to set its own discount rate. In 1975, the PBGC adopted a regulation pursuant
to which it calculates the amount of its claims, prescribing assumptions as to
mortality and retirement, as well as the discount rate to be applied (the
“Valuation Regulation”).5 For over 40 years, the PBGC has used the
Valuation Regulation to calculate claims in U.S. bankruptcies.
The PBGC’s methodology involves a survey of insurance company
annuity prices that the PBGC uses, in conjunction with its own assumptions
as to mortality and retirement, to “solve” for the interest factors that it applies
to discount future payments (for purposes of this Article, the “Annuity
Interest Factors,” though that term is not used by the PBGC). Annuity
contracts are contracts between an investor and an insurance company in
which the investor gives a lump sum to the insurance company in exchange
for a stream of periodic payments in the future. These are by definition low
(near zero) risk investments, offered only by well-capitalized financial
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 – 1461.
3. The statutory limit is beyond the scope of this Article. For simplicity, we assume
here that the full amount of benefits is guaranteed, though this is not necessarily true in every
situation.
4. The transfer of the pension plan assets and the related commencement of payment
by the PBGC of pension obligations may in practice post-date plan termination.
5. 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-75. The Valuation Regulation allows for the use of more than
one discount rate depending on the time period involved, though each discount rate would be
based on the Annuity Interest Factors described infra.
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institutions, and typically imply a low discount rate. In theory, the PBGC’s
use of the Annuity Interest Factors could make sense if the PBGC purchased
annuity contracts to lock in a low risk instrument that would fund the
required payments over time. If the PBGC purchased annuity contracts,
there would be a perfect match between the damage suffered by the PBGC
and the cost incurred by the PBGC in remedying that damage.6
There is a hitch, however. The PBGC does not buy annuity contracts.
Instead, it employs a sophisticated and diversified investment strategy that
over time has yielded average returns of about 8%,7 significantly higher than
the returns that would be obtained through the purchase of annuities. The
difference between the discount rate implied by the Annuity Interest Factors
and the actual rate of return on the PBGC’s investment portfolio means that
by using the Valuation Regulation, the PBGC claims the right to collect more
money than it needs to meet future pension obligations for any given
terminated plan. The difference can be dramatic: In one reported case, the
difference between the PBGC’s UBL claim based on the Valuation
Regulation and the amount of the claim based on an assumed rate of return
based on a diversified portfolio (at times referred to as the “prudent investor
rate”) was over $47 million – a difference of some 95%.8 At the same time,
the PBGC, which unlike insurance companies suffers from a significant
deficit,9 is unable to provide the certainty of an annuity. In other words, the
PBGC effectively charges sponsors of terminating plans for a level of
certainty that it cannot in fact provide to plan participants once it assumes

6. This approach is used in the United Kingdom under the Pensions Act 1995, c. 26 §
74 (UK), whereby upon the termination of the covered pension plan, the plan trustees will
purchase an annuity to provide for payment of their equivalent of UBL. Also, in the United
Kingdom, the plan assets of unrelated terminated plans are not co-mingled in a single pool as
is the case in the U.S.
7. See Table 1 and accompanying discussion, infra.
8. PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001). The PBGC’s UBL claim based on the Valuation
Regulation was $49,658,702.19, while the amount of the claim based on a prudent investor
rate was $1,822,075.19. Id.
9. The PBGC’s 2016 annual report indicates a deficit of $20.6 billion for the singleemployer program and $58.8 billion for the multiemployer program. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT
GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 10. The Government Accountability Office has been highlighting the
financial difficulties and chronic underfunding of the PBGC for decades, stating, for example,
in a 1989 report that “[s]ince its inception, the program’s losses and administrative costs have
exceeded premiums collected.” U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-90-11,
FEDERAL CREDIT AND INSURANCE: PROGRAMS MAY REQUIRE INCREASED FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE 32 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-9011 [https://perma.cc/DE38-RL3N]. After this Article was prepared, the PBGC released its
2017 Annual Report, indicating a $10.9 billion deficit for the single-employer program and a
$65.1 billion deficit for the multiemployer program. 2017 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.
ANN. REP. 10.
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responsibility for the benefits at issue.
Since the PBGC’s UBL claim only comes into play when a pension plan
is terminated – and since under current law a plan sponsor can only
voluntarily terminate an underfunded plan when it meets one of several
statutory tests for financial distress – issues surrounding the PBGC’s
Valuation Regulation to date have only been litigated in the bankruptcy
courts.10 In this context, the PBGC’s unilateral selection of a discount rate
affects not only the debtors, but other pari passu unsecured creditors as well,
all of whom must seek recovery from the same limited pool of assets, but
none of whom enjoy comparable license to dictate the discount rate
applicable to future payments.11 Litigants have therefore argued – sometimes
successfully, sometimes not – that a bankruptcy court should disregard the
Valuation Regulation when it leads to an overstatement of the PBGC’s UBL
claim (i.e., when it overstates the amount by which the plan is actually
underfunded), and instead make its own estimation of the amount the PBGC
will likely need to satisfy future pension obligations, just as a bankruptcy
court would estimate similar claims for future cash flows when brought by
non-PBGC creditors. To do otherwise, the argument goes, would provide
the PBGC with an unearned “windfall” in excess of the amount it likely
needs to meet the terminated plan’s future pension obligations. Indeed, the
significant – sometimes massive – disparity between the size of the PBGC’s
UBL claim under the Valuation Regulation and the prudent investor rate is
so substantial that it has an in terrorem effect on settlement dynamics, not
unlike the pressure put on criminal defendants under the Federal Sentencing
10. ERISA provides two ways for a plan sponsor to voluntarily terminate a pension plan:
standard and distress. First, in a “standard” termination, the plan contains sufficient assets to
meet the benefits owed or promised to participants, and so the employer distributes the assets
to the participants through the purchase of annuities from private insurance companies or
through payment of an upfront lump sum to participants. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b). In this
situation, the PBGC has no liability to pay and does not pay benefits to participants in the
terminated plan. Second, in a “distress” termination, the plan is underfunded and the
employer may only terminate if it satisfies one of four statutory distress tests. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1341(c). In a distress termination, the PBGC takes over the plan and assumes both the assets
and the responsibility for paying benefits. ERISA also provides a means for involuntary
termination instituted by the PBGC. 29 U.S.C. § 1342. In an involuntary termination, the
PBGC also takes over the plan and assumes both the assets and the responsibility for paying
benefits.
11. While this Article looks at the harm to pari passu creditors arising from the PBGC’s
policy, there are likely harms to plan participants as well, since the PBGC uses the same
Valuation Regulation to determine the allocation of plan benefits upon termination. See
AMERICAN RETIREES EDUC. FOUND., PENSION GUARANTEES THAT WORK FOR RETIREES: A
PROPOSAL FOR COMMONSENSE PBGC REFORMS 13-20 (February 1, 2017), available at
http://www.nrln.org/flyin%20whtpprs/WP.%20PBGC%20Rules%20Reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8NF-UGBK] (discussing the consequences of PBGC’s interest rate
assumptions for American retirees).
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Guidelines.
The “windfall” argument against the Valuation Regulation has had
mixed results. Both the Tenth and Sixth Circuits have held that the Valuation
Regulation does not control in bankruptcy when it comes into conflict with
the central bankruptcy principle that all similarly situated creditors be treated
alike, and have instead applied a prudent investor rate.12 In 2003, however,
the bankruptcy court overseeing the U.S. Airways chapter 11 proceedings
broke with these precedents and held that it was bound by the Valuation
Regulation, explicitly disagreeing with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.13
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Raleigh v. Illinois Department
of Revenue,14 the U.S. Airways court held that the substantive nonbankruptcy law that gave rise to the PBGC’s UBL claim – ERISA and the
PBGC’s implementing regulations – applied in bankruptcy, regardless of the
effect on other creditors.15 Since then, no circuit court has addressed the
issue, but every bankruptcy court to do so has followed U.S. Airways, albeit
with little or no independent analysis.16 The PBGC has made no secret of
the importance of these decisions to its strategy in pursuing outsized
bankruptcy claims and how that strategy aids the agency in its efforts to
climb out of its multi-billion dollar deficit. As it stated in 2013, “[t]hese
decisions have given PBGC significant leverage in enforcing its
underfunding claims at a time when the agency faces a $23 billion deficit,”
and “[i]ndeed, PBGC has not had a claims objection litigated to decision
since the above cases were decided.”17
Whether bankruptcy courts are in fact bound to apply the Valuation
Regulation is a question that implicates thorny and conflicting issues of
bankruptcy, ERISA, and administrative law. For one thing, the holding in
Raleigh arguably should not apply to this fact pattern, as the prudent investor
issue is, in practice, primarily litigated in bankruptcy. Moreover, application
of the Valuation Regulation, which increases the PBGC’s UBL claim beyond
any reasonable estimate of the PBGC’s own costs of providing the pension
benefits, clashes directly with the fundamental principle of bankruptcy law
that similarly situated creditors be treated alike, with none being entitled to
12. PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators
of Utah, Inc.), 150 F. 3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999).
13. In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
14. 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
15. U.S. Airways, 303 B.R. at 793.
16. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., DERIVATION OF INTEREST FACTORS IN PBGC’S
LIABILITY VALUATION METHODOLOGY 12 (Sept. 6, 2013), available at https://www.pbgc.gov
/documents/LiabilityValuation-20130906.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2FMY-JSUG] [hereinafter
the “WHITE PAPER”].
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a claim in an amount greater than what it is owed. At the same time,
however, any challenge to the validity of the Valuation Regulation must
confront principles of administrative law, including deference to reasonable
agency interpretations of the statutes they administer under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)18 and the Chevron19 doctrine, which
provides that broad, but not unlimited, deference be given to federal agency
determinations.
This Article proposes a different path through this legal thicket.20
Sidestepping the Raleigh question, this Article argues that the PBGC’s
current Valuation Regulation is invalid – both in bankruptcy and outside
bankruptcy – because it leads to an overstatement of the PBGC’s claim that
is directly contradictory to the PBGC’s own rationale for the Valuation
Regulation put forward in the Federal Register during the notice-andcomment rulemaking process. As stated by the PBGC as early as 1975 and
as recently as 1993, the rationale for the Valuation Regulation is that the
amount of the PBGC’s claim should be based on the PBGC’s own costs in
providing the pension benefits. This traditional definition of a damages
claim makes sense, as the only purpose of the PBGC’s right to collect a UBL
claim is to allow it to pay out future pension benefits. The problem, however,
is that the Annuity Interest Factors currently used in the Valuation
Regulation significantly overstate the cost to the PBGC of providing the
pension benefits, thus resulting in an artificially low discount rate, which in
turn results in an artificially high UBL claim.
Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard requires that an agency examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”21 Even if the

18. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2011).
19. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(discussing deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they
administer).
20. While a few articles discuss the PBGC’s Valuation Regulation and the conflict that
arises when that regulation is applied in bankruptcy, none has conducted the analysis
presented here. See, e.g., Gregory M. Gordon et. al., Present Value Discounting of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 33 (2008) (discussing the differences between
the prudent investor rate and the PBGC’s regulatory discount rate); John H. Rains IV, Note,
Searching for Fairness in All the Wrong Places: Valuing the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation’s Unsecured Claim in Bankruptcy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1107 (2006) (arguing that
Congress should adopt the valuation method promulgated by the PBGC in order to increase
the PBGC’s recovery in bankruptcy); Debra A. Riley, The Questionable Future of the
Prudent-Investor Rate: Will ERISA Claims Dilute-Further-the Dividends for Trade
Creditors?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. (July/Aug. 2004) (discussing potential impact of U.S.
Airways decision).
21. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Motor
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agency can articulate a legitimate reason for a given policy choice, its
method of effectuating this policy choice must be rational – if there is no
relationship between an agency’s policy objective and its approach, then the
approach must be struck down as arbitrary and capricious.22 Despite paying
lip service to Chevron and the APA in passing,23 litigants to date have not
truly pursued this issue, and the courts have never squarely addressed it. This
Article proposes that courts should engage in the careful analysis required
by the Supreme Court’s instruction to assess whether an agency rule is
consistent with the facts before the agency and the agency’s stated rationale
in adopting the regulation in light of those facts.
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview
of the role of the PBGC and UBL claims in the context of the private-sector,
defined-benefit insurance program established under ERISA. Part II
examines the split of authority between courts that have enforced the
Valuation Regulation in bankruptcy and those that have concluded that it is
not binding when it overstates the PBGC’s UBL claims. Part III argues that
the Valuation Regulation’s use of Annuity Interest Factors is arbitrary and
capricious because it fails to reflect the PBGC’s actual cost of providing the
pension benefits, and is therefore inconsistent with the PBGC’s own stated
rationale for the regulation, if not the statute itself. Part IV demonstrates that
the PBGC’s attempts at post hoc rationalizations for the Annuity Interest
Factors – including the PBGC’s arguments that the Valuation Regulation
reflects a “market price” for the insurance it offers to plan participants and
avoids a purported “moral hazard” that would otherwise exist – do not justify
their use. The Conclusion offers suggestions for reform.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF THE VALUATION REGULATION
UNDER ERISA
A. ERISA’s Insurance Program

In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA, a federal statute designed to protect
The legislation
certain private sector workers’ pension benefits.24
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
22. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55-64 (2011) (holding that courts must reject
an agency rule “unmoored from the purposes and concerns” of the relevant statute and that an
agency must effectuate its policy choice in “some rational way” and “based on non-arbitrary,
relevant factors” (internal citations omitted)).
23. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
24. At the time of its enactment, the defined benefit pension plan was the typical pension
plan for American workers with pension benefits. PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO,
ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 3.03 (4th ed. 2016 Supp.). Defined contribution pension
plans, typified by plans qualifying under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C.
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established minimum standards for participation, vesting, and funding,
requirements for reporting and disclosure, and obligations for fiduciaries, all
aimed at safeguarding the integrity of private pension plans and ensuring that
plans would have sufficient assets to pay benefits when due.25
A key component of the comprehensive reform Congress undertook
with ERISA was the establishment of an insurance program, administered
by the PBGC, “to protect employees against the loss of vested benefits in the
event of plan termination.”26 The PBGC is “a wholly owned, self-financing
government corporation,” within the Department of Labor, “charged with
guaranteeing the payment of certain benefits in terminated” defined-benefit
plans up to certain legal limits.27 The PBGC insures private, defined-benefit
pension plans under two separate programs, a single-employer program and
a multiemployer program,28 which are operated and financed separately.29
The single-employer program insures approximately 30 million participants
in more than 22,000 pension plans,30 while the multiemployer program
covers over 10 million participants in approximately 1,400 pension plans.31
According to the PBGC, since its creation in 1974, it has “become
responsible for more than 1.5 million people in over 4,800 failed singleemployer and multiemployer plans.”32 This Article focuses on the singleemployer program, as this is the context in which the discount rate question
has been litigated.
The PBGC funds its insurance programs through four sources. First,
the PBGC collects premiums paid by plan sponsors covered under the
program.33 Second, when the PBGC becomes the trustee for a terminated
§ 401(k), were not introduced until 1978 by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 135, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785 (1978). ERISA does not purport to cover defined benefit pension
plans offered to public employees. Those employees relied, and continue to rely, on the taxing
power of the public-sector sponsor, a structure which sets the stage for its own looming crisis.
25. PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE §§
1.01, 1.02, 1.04. The stated purposes of ERISA included encouraging participation in
retirement plans and addressing concerns over perceived abuses in the private pension system.
H.R. REP. No. 93-807 (1974), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671, 4676-81.
26. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5184.
27. H.R. REP. No. 99-300, at 278 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 756, 929;
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-271, REP. TO CONG. REQUESTERS, PENSION
BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.: ASSET MANAGEMENT NEEDS BETTER STEWARDSHIP 3 (June 2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320643.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7V2-9SFP]
[hereinafter “GAO-11-271 REPORT”].
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301 – 1311.
29. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 1.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. In the 2010 fiscal year, for example, the
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pension plan, it takes possession of the assets of the terminated plan.34 Third,
after the termination of a plan and the assumption of that plan’s assets, the
PBGC may assert a claim (typically in bankruptcy) against each plan sponsor
(or any member of its “controlled group”) for the amount of unfunded benefit
liabilities.35 Finally, the PBGC engages professional asset management
firms to invest its assets and earns investment income from the returns on
total assets held.36 The PBGC receives no federal taxpayer funding and the
federal government is not required to financially assist the PBGC in meeting
its obligations.37
The PBGC holds its investment assets in two funds: the revolving fund
and the trust fund.38 The revolving fund contains the PBGC’s premium
revenues and is invested in Treasury securities.39 Revolving fund
investments totaled approximately $26 billion as of September 30, 2016.40
The trust fund contains the assets recovered from trusteed plans and their
sponsors and related investment income.41 Total trust fund investments
amounted to approximately $65.6 billion, as of September 30, 2016.42
The PBGC uses private investment management firms to administer its
investment assets, in accordance with an investment policy statement.43
Under the investment policy, the PBGC’s goal has long been to “prudently
maximize investment returns”44 through investments mainly in equities and
fixed-income securities; it does not buy annuities.45 According to its 2016
Annual Report, the PBGC manages approximately $100 billion in total

PBGC collected approximately $2.3 billion in premiums.
34. GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. In the 2010 fiscal year, the PBGC
assumed approximately $1.8 billion in assets from 147 terminated defined-benefit plans.
35. GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
36. GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. For example, in the fiscal year 2010, the
PBGC earned $7.8 billion from its investment portfolio. Id.
37. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 1, Sep. 2016.
38. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 41.
39. The PBGC is required by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(3), to invest a portion of the
revolving fund assets in government debt securities. While it has discretion to invest a portion
of this fund in other non-governmental debt products, the PBGC’s current policy is to only
invest in Treasury securities. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 41.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 11.
44. 2008 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 18; see 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR.
CORP. ANN. REP. 42 (stating that “[t]he objective of PBGC’s investment policy is to maximize
funded status within a prudent risk framework that is informed by PBGC’s fixed obligations
and asset composition of potential trusteed plans,” and noting that “[t]he investment policy
establishes a 30 percent target asset allocation for equities and other non-fixed income assets,
and a 70 percent asset allocation for fixed income”).
45. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 68.

BROMLEY_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

VALUATION REGULATION IN BANKRUPTCY

8/10/2018 3:12 PM

257

assets.46 Through this strategy, the PBGC achieves average returns on its
total assets in the range of 8 to 9 percent.47
B. UBL Claims under ERISA
As referenced above, one source of the PBGC’s funding is its recovery
on claims in respect of a terminated plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities.
Specifically, ERISA provides that the PBGC is entitled to recover “the total
amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities (as of the termination date) [owed]
to all participants and beneficiaries under the plan, together with interest (at
a reasonable rate) calculated from the termination date in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the corporation [i.e., the PBGC].”48 As amended,
ERISA defines the “amount of unfunded benefit liabilities” to mean, “as of
any date, the excess (if any) of – (A) the value of the benefit liabilities under
the plan (determined as of such date on the basis of assumptions prescribed
by the corporation for purposes of section 1344 of this title), over (B) the
current value (as of such date) of the assets of the plan.).”49
Congress also granted the PBGC a unique collection advantage over
other creditors – an advantage particularly valuable in the context of a
bankruptcy filing. ERISA effectively pierces the corporate veil of each
member of a corporate group, making all members jointly and severally
liable to the PBGC for the UBL claim (as well as certain other claims the
PBGC may be able to assert), regardless of whether any particular member
was the plan sponsor or benefited in any way from the work performed by
the pension plan participants. Specifically, the statute provides that the
PBGC is permitted to recover from any member of the plan sponsor’s
“controlled group” – defined to mean, “in connection with any person, a

46. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 11.
47. See Table 1 and accompanying discussion, infra (listing the annual and average fiveyear returns reported by the PBGC).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1)(A).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18). For simplicity, this Article uses the term “unfunded benefit
liability” to refer to the PBGC’s claim regardless of time period, even though that term was
first defined by Congress in 1987. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA),
Pub. L. No. 100–203, § 9313, 101 Stat 1330 (1987). In the House Report on the amendment,
the Committee on Education and Labor “recognize[d] that valuing benefit liabilities for
purposes of determining an employer’s liability to participants and beneficiaries may be
difficult,” and that “in a distress or involuntary termination, such valuation results in inherent
tension between the PBGC and the persons responsible for asserting and collecting the claims
for unfunded benefit liabilities and for paying such liability to plan participants, because the
PBGC and those persons are competing for the same employer dollars.” H.R. REP. No. 100391, at 124 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313–99. The Committee
therefore explained that it “expect[ed] that the PBGC will develop standards for valuing
benefit liabilities that are as objective as possible.” Id.
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group consisting of such person and all other persons under common control
with such person” – each of which is jointly and severally liable for the UBL
claim.50
C. The Valuation Regulation
The PBGC first promulgated the Valuation Regulation in a rule
proposed in 1975, adopted on an interim basis in 1976 and finalized in 1981
following a notice-and-comment procedure.51 The PBGC has used this
Valuation Regulation ever since as its framework for calculating the present
value of its bankruptcy claim, with periodic adjustments to the underlying
assumptions used in the calculus.52
As is relevant here, the current Valuation Regulation states as follows:
The plan administrator shall value all benefits as of the valuation
date by – (a) Using the mortality assumptions prescribed by
§4044.53 and the interest assumptions prescribed in appendix B to
this part; (b) Using interpolation methods, where necessary, at
least as accurate as linear interpolation; (c) Using valuation
formulas that accord with generally accepted actuarial principles
and practices; and (d) Adjusting the values to reflect loading
expenses in accordance with appendix C to this part.53
The “interest assumptions prescribed in appendix B” provide the
discount rates used to generate the PBGC’s UBL claims asserted in any
bankruptcy proceeding. Tellingly, the Valuation Regulation itself omits any
explanation of how the PBGC derived the interest rates contained in
appendix B. Rather, appendix B simply consists of a table titled “Interest
Rates Used To Value Benefits,” which lists only the applicable interest rate
for a given period, nothing more.54 Thus, while a general description of the
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(14) (defining “controlled group”); 29 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (“In any
case in which a single-employer plan is terminated in a distress termination under section
1341(c) of this title or a termination otherwise instituted by the corporation under section
1342 of this title, any person who is, on the termination date, a contributing sponsor of the
plan or a member of such a contributing sponsor’s controlled group shall incur liability under
this section. The liability under this section of all such persons shall be joint and several.”).
The ability of the PBGC to assert claims against all members of a corporate group, including,
arguably, members located outside of the United States, means that the PBGC cannot suffer
from structural subordination. No other pre-filing unsecured creditor is granted this sort of
priority treatment. 11 U.S.C. § 507. Only post-filing lenders providing debtor-in-possession
financing may be granted superior treatment by the bankruptcy court, but such treatment is
limited expressly by the amount of the financing provided. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c), (d).
51. See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
52. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-75 (setting out the current Valuation Regulation).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 4044.52.
54. 29 C.F.R. Part 4044, Appendix B.
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survey-based methodology for determining the Annuity Interest Factors has
been included in various Federal Register publications,55 the actual codified
regulation contains only the numbers to be used as interest factors, without
further explanation.
Elsewhere, however, the PBGC has explained its methodology for
deriving the Annuity Interest Factors in greater detail. According to the
explanation published by the PBGC on its website, the Annuity Interest
Factors are derived from a survey (the “Survey”) performed by the American
Council of Life Insurers (the “ACLI”), which inquires of private insurance
companies the price that they would charge for group annuities contracts as
of the termination date.56 According to the PBGC, the Annuity Interest
Factors are meant to estimate “the approximate cost of purchasing equivalent
annuities from an insurance company in the private sector.”57 The
participants in each Survey consist of a group of life insurers, but are
otherwise anonymous to the PBGC. The ACLI asks for the annuity prices
the insurers would charge on hypothetical pension streams paying $10 a
month to individuals starting at a given age, over various age profiles. The
PBGC then uses these prices to infer a new annuity pricing schedule based
on PBGC mortality tables. The resulting interest factors are the rates that
best set the PBGC assumed pension payments equal to their inferred prices.58
II.

TWO CONFLICTING LINES OF CASES

Whether the Valuation Regulation is controlling in bankruptcy remains
unsettled. The only two Courts of Appeals to address the issue, the Sixth
and the Tenth Circuits, have concluded that the Valuation Regulation leads
to an overstatement of the PBGC’s claim that is inconsistent with bankruptcy
law and have therefore held that, at least in bankruptcy, the Valuation
55. 41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976) (“The initial interest rates used are derived
from annuity price data obtained by PBGC from the private insurance industry. The PBGC’s
interest assumptions have been designed so that, when coupled with the mortality assumptions
found in the regulation, the benefit values obtained for immediate and deferred annuities are
in line with industry annuity prices.”); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980); 58
Fed. Reg. 50812 (Sept. 28, 1993); 70 Fed. Reg. 12429, 12430 (Mar. 14, 2005) (providing
general descriptions of the methodology for determining Annuity Interest Factors).
56. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 1.
57. Id.
58. This Article does not address the problems with the PBGC’s Survey-based
methodology for determining the Annuity Interest Factors used in the Valuation Regulation.
Rather, without endorsing the PBGC’s methodology, the Article assumes that the Annuity
Interest Factors accurately reflect the prices that private life insurance companies would
charge to offer group annuities of the sort as to which pricing is sought by the PBGC. Others
have noted, however, that the Survey methodology appears to be far from perfect. See infra
note 98.
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Regulation is not controlling and that a prudent investor rate should be
applied to calculate the PBGC’s UBL claims.59 Since In re U.S. Airways
Grp., Inc.60 in 2003, however, every bankruptcy court to address the issue
has held that it was bound by the Valuation Regulation. None of these
bankruptcy decisions has been appealed to a Court of Appeals, and as such,
to date, no Court of Appeals has adopted the view put forward in U.S.
Airways, and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue.61
A. The Tenth and Sixth Circuits Have Concluded That the Prudent
Investor Rate Applies in Bankruptcy
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue first in 1998, in PBGC v. CF&I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.).62 As
framed by the court in that case, “[t]he major controversy between the parties
[was] whether the ERISA provisions carry over into bankruptcy or whether
PBGC comes to Chapter 11 like any other unsecured creditor.”63 The PBGC,
the Tenth Circuit concluded, “is not entitled to special rights in bankruptcy
and its ERISA powers and rights do not give it priority over the other
unsecured creditors of CF&I’s estate.”64
The Tenth Circuit began by observing that “[i]nasmuch as those
liabilities [i.e., the PBGC’s UBL claims] are for beneficiaries’ payments that
extend into the future, the amount of the liability must be reduced to present
value so the debt can be dealt with under the reorganization plan.”65 Indeed,

59. PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators
of Utah, Inc.), 150 F. 3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999).
60. 303 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
61. The lack of appeals is consistent with the deal-centric philosophy that characterizes
most large chapter 11 proceedings. Very often, a resolution with the PBGC is a condition for
a company to emerge from chapter 11, as was the case with U.S. Airways, thus creating a
situation where parties may choose to litigate the PBGC claim issue before the bankruptcy
court on a timeline that is roughly coincident with the timeline for plan confirmation, but are
highly incentivized to avoid lengthy appeals. Although certain claims issues can be reserved
for final determination post-confirmation, in most large chapter 11 cases, the size of the
PBGC’s claims prevents post-confirmation resolution. The fact that the PBGC’s claims are,
by virtue of their joint-and-several nature, filed against all debtors in a multi-debtor setting
(where the PBGC’s claims can often represent all or nearly all of the claims against certain
debtors) nearly always requires resolution of the PBGC’s claims prior to, and thus as a
condition to, confirmation.
62. 150 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999).
63. Id. at 1295.
64. Id. at 1295. The decision in CF&I also addressed questions concerning the tax and
priority treatment of the PBGC’s claims, which are beyond the scope of this Article and
therefore not addressed here.
65. Id. at 1300.
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the parties in CF&I agreed that 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), which provides that the
court “shall determine the amount” of claims “as of the date of the filing of
the petition,” mandated that the PBGC’s claim be discounted to present
value, disagreeing only on the methodology for doing so.66 As the court
noted, “[t]he dispute is significant because the proffered methods produce
marked differences of $222,866,000 if PBGC’s approach is utilized or
$124,441,000 if CF&I prevails.”67 In other words, the PBGC claimed an
entitlement to nearly twice the sum calculated by CF&I based on the
different assumptions in discounting.
In holding that a prudent investor rate applied in bankruptcy, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the PBGC’s argument that the Valuation Regulation was
controlling under Chevron, concluding that “[a]lthough valid in other
contexts, we do not believe these principles are applicable here” for two
reasons.68 First, the Tenth Circuit noted that ERISA’s definition of
“unfunded benefit liabilities” in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18) is expressly limited
to defining that term “for purposes of this title [ERISA]” and therefore, in
the court’s view, “cannot extend to bankruptcy.”69 Second, the court held
that the ERISA definition of unfunded benefit liabilities “conflicts with
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,” and that the Bankruptcy Code
“controlled.”70 Citing bankruptcy’s “cardinal rule that all claims within the
same class must be treated alike” under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4), the court
held that “[t]hat principle would be violated here if PBGC’s interpretation of
§ 1301(a)(18) were adopted because PBGC’s discount rate would apply only
to it and not any other general unsecured creditor.”71 Congress, the court
concluded, had made clear under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) that “when ERISA
conflicts with another provision of federal law, ERISA must be
subordinated.”72 In short, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[n]othing in the
ERISA sections relied upon by PBGC implies a carry-over into the realm of
bankruptcy to allow PBGC to set its own valuation methodology.”73
Two years later, in PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.),74 the
Sixth Circuit was confronted with the same issue. The PBGC had argued
below that the value of its UBL claim was $49,658,702.19, based on an
investment return rate premised on the Valuation Regulation of “6.4% for

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001).
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the first 20 years and 5.75% thereafter.”75 After the bankruptcy court held
that the Valuation Regulation assumptions used in determining that amount
would give the PBGC an unearned “windfall,” and ruled that a prudent
investor rate should apply, the parties stipulated that “a ‘prudent investor’
rate would be a 10% return,” which resulted in a claim of $1,822,075.19 –
less than five percent of the amount generated by the Valuation Regulation.76
While not adopting all aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis,77 the
Sixth Circuit largely agreed with its conclusion, holding that “the bankruptcy
court’s authority under 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) and 1123(a)(4) to determine the
amount of claims in bankruptcy proceedings and treat creditors in the same
class equally gives it the authority to value unfunded benefit liabilities claims
using a ‘prudent investor rate.’”78
The Sixth Circuit also considered, but rejected, the argument that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue,79
which had come down after the Tenth Circuit decided CF&I, mandated a
different outcome. In Raleigh, the Supreme Court held that “bankruptcy
does not alter the burden imposed by the substantive law” otherwise
governing a state-law tax claim, reaffirming the general principles that “the
validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law,” and
that while “Congress of course may do what it likes with entitlements in
bankruptcy,” courts will only presume Congress did so when it makes a clear
indication.80 In its analysis, the Supreme Court had distinguished the burden
of proof, which it considered a question of the claim’s “validity” – and
therefore governed by non-bankruptcy law – from questions of claim
“allowance,” which are governed by bankruptcy law.81 In the Sixth Circuit’s
view, under Raleigh, “[w]hile the validity of a claim might be a matter for
nonbankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to
determine the allowability and amount of the claim.”82 The applicable
discount rate, the Sixth Circuit concluded, was not a question of validity and
therefore fell within the bankruptcy court’s purview.
75. Id. at 507-08.
76. Id. at 508.
77. In particular, the CSC Indus. court stated: “We are not entirely persuaded that the
district and CF&I courts were correct in concluding that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d), which provides
that ‘[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States,’ requires that the ERISA provision, 29
U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18), be subordinated to the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1144(d), on its face,
applies only to subchapter I of ERISA, whereas the definition of unfunded benefit liabilities,
section 1301(a)(18), is found in subchapter III of ERISA.” Id. at 509.
78. Id.
79. 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
80. Id. at 17, 21, 25.
81. Id. at 22-24.
82. CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509.
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, like the Tenth Circuit, that “[t]he
PBGC’s authority to promulgate regulations governing the valuation of
unfunded benefit liabilities does not extend so far as to subordinate the
authority of the bankruptcy courts to value claims in bankruptcy
proceedings,” and “the PBGC should be treated like any other unsecured
creditor in the bankruptcy reorganization; therefore, the use of the ‘prudent
investor rate’ to value the PBGC’s claim was appropriate.”83
B. Following U.S. Airways, Bankruptcy Courts Have Concluded That
the Valuation Regulation Controls in Bankruptcy
Three years after the CSC Indus. decision, the bankruptcy court
overseeing the U.S. Airways bankruptcy84 broke with the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits. There, the PBGC asserted a UBL claim of approximately $2.219
billion,85 based on “a discount rate of 5.1% for the first 20 years and 5.25%
thereafter.”86 U.S. Airways objected to the PBGC’s UBL claim. Using a
discount rate of 8%, as well as more up to date mortality figures and different
retirement assumptions, U.S. Airways calculated a UBL amount of only
$894 million – roughly one third the size of the UBL claim determined under
the Valuation Regulation.87
The U.S. Airways court “respectfully disagree[d]” with the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits, concluding that under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Raleigh, it was bound to apply the Valuation Regulation.88 Even while
recognizing that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, empowered under
the Bankruptcy Code in certain circumstances to alter legal rights as they
exist outside of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court rejected any distinction
between the “validity” and the “amount” of the claim under Raleigh,
concluding that both were governed by non-bankruptcy law.89
83. Id. at 509. Prior to the CF&I and CSC Indus. decisions, the Bankruptcy Court in the
Southern District of New York had held that the PBGC is not entitled to deference because it
has no inherent expertise in determining the present value of projected future payments. LTV
Corp. v. PBGC (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 773 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d
130 B.R. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, withdrawn, 17 E.B.C. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Although this decision was ultimately withdrawn by consent order after the parties settled,
courts have continued to cite it as persuasive authority. See, e.g., In re Loewen Grp. Int’l Inc.,
B.R. 427, 435 (Bankr. D. De. 2002).
84. The U.S. Airways bankruptcy took place in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Virginia, which is located in the Fourth Circuit.
85. 303 B.R. at 787.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 788.
88. Id. at 792.
89. Id. at 793. Interestingly, the bankruptcy court opined that “if the PBGC held merely
a common-law indemnity claim for future benefits owed to the pilots, there can be little doubt
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Despite concluding that the Valuation Regulation was controlling under
Raleigh, the court went on to consider whether that regulation materially
overstated the PBGC’s UBL claim. In doing so, the court acknowledged that
the PBGC invests its trust fund assets “in a mixture of equities and bonds
similar to those of most pension plans” and as a result “has done pretty well
over the long haul,” such that “returns on the PBGC’s trust fund assets over
the 18-year period from 1985 through 2002 are approximately 10% on an
annual basis.”90 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that “[t]he real issue is one
of risk.”91 It concluded that since “no one can predict with certainty what
returns the stock market will produce over the next 50 years,” and “[g]iven
the strong societal interest in protecting pension benefits, a risk-free or nearly
risk-free rate to value the pension liability is more appropriate than a rate
based on optimistic projections (even if those projections are widely-shared
by fund managers) as to the stock market’s future long-term performance.”92
Thus, it said, “the court is unable to conclude that use of a ‘prudent investor’
rate is necessary to avoid overstating the actual loss resulting from the
distress termination.”93
Although the record does not indicate that any party made detailed
arguments concerning the Valuation Regulation’s validity under the APA or
Chevron,94 the bankruptcy court referenced both in concluding that the
that this court would have full authority to determine an appropriate discount rate as well as
related assumptions as to mortality and expected retirement age,” and that, “[i]n this
connection, 8% would hardly be an unreasonable choice for a discount rate.” Id. It concluded,
however, that “the court is not simply valuing a contingent future loss,” but “[r]ather,
Congress, by statute, has expressly given the PBGC a present right to recover an amount
determined in accordance with the valuation regulation.” Id.
90. Id. at 795.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 796.
93. Id. The U.S. Airways court apparently discounted the concern of a “windfall” to the
PBGC, stating that such “‘windfall’ rhetoric must be taken with a large grain of salt” because,
in that case, “claims are being paid with stock having an estimated value equal to less than
two cents for each dollar in allowed claims, [such that] full allowance of the PBGC’s claim
could never result in the PBGC receiving more than the amount of its actual loss.” Id. at 791
n.6. This analysis overlooks, however, that regardless of whether claims were being paid in
stock, worth pennies on the dollar, or in 100 cent dollars, in both cases the PBGC receives
more than its fair share of the pool of assets if it is given an oversized claim. Where recoveries
are such that creditors do not receive payment in full, other creditors suffer from the PBGC’s
outsized claim. Where recoveries to creditors are sufficient to pay all similarly situated
creditors in full, given the absolute priority rule embodied in Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the
Bankruptcy Code, junior or subordinated creditors, or even preferred or common equity,
suffer from the PBGC’s outsized claims. There is no harmless error if the PBGC’s outsized
claims are permitted.
94. Indeed, in attempting to avoid discovery in the U.S. Airways dispute, the PBGC made
a point of the fact that “[n]owhere in their objection to the PBGC Proof of Claim do the
Reorganized Debtors purport to challenge the Valuation Regulation under the Administrative
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regulation was valid. Citing the Chevron doctrine, the court concluded that
“considerable deference must be given to the PBGC, as the agency
responsible for carrying out a legislatively-delegated function, for
determining how best to implement the statutory mandate.”95 Similarly, as
to the APA, the court concluded that “[g]iven the presumption of validity
that must be accorded the PBGC regulation, the debtor has simply not
presented sufficient evidence for the court to find that the survey is an
irrational or arbitrary means for the PBGC to measure the close-out liability
of a terminated pension plan.”96
Critically, as to both conclusions, the U.S. Airways court assumed that
the use of annuity pricing was relevant to the claims calculation: “The stated
goal of the regulation is to determine a value for the unfunded benefit
liabilities that approximates the cost of purchasing an annuity contract from
a commercial insurer that would pay the same benefits.”97 Though candidly
acknowledging that the ACLI “survey has serious limitations,”98 the court
Procedure[] Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, (the ‘APA’) as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s
Motion to Quash or, in the Alternative, for a Protective Order at 11, In re US Airways Group,
Inc., No. 02-83984-SSM, D.I. 4182 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 6, 2003).
95. 303 B.R. at 797.
96. Id. at 798.
97. Id. at 797. The U.S. Airways court stated this twice, the first time citing a notice in
the Federal Register from 1993. See id. at 788 (“The stated goal of the regulation is to generate
a value which will ‘accurately approximate the cost of [single-premium] group annuity
contracts’ that would pay the benefits promised under the terminated plan.” (quoting 58 Fed.
Reg. 5128)). As discussed in the next section of this Article, however, this statement of the
Valuation Regulation’s purpose is incorrect, and indeed is contradicted by the very same
Federal Register publication.
98. Id. at 797. The court stated:
That the survey has serious limitations is hardly to be questioned. Because of the
anonymous manner in which the survey is conducted, the PBGC has no way of
knowing whether it is receiving responses from market leaders or small players,
nor does it have any way of independently verifying that the values reported on
the survey forms accurately reflect what the responding company is actually
charging for the annuity policies it sells. Indeed, because it does not itself send
out the survey forms, the PBGC does not even know the specific universe of
companies to which the forms were sent. As the General Accounting Office has
recently observed in a report to Congress, the anonymous nature of the survey
necessarily creates “ambiguity about the extent to which the PBGC interest rate
factors reflect the current broad market for group annuities.” These limitations
are an unavoidable consequence of the unwillingness of commercial insurance
companies to release sensitive pricing information (or at least, to release it in such
a form that specific prices can be identified with specific companies). Short of
Congress enacting a statute permitting the PBGC to subpoena the information, it
is difficult to see how the PBGC could overcome the inherent limitations of the
present survey.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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reasoned that “the issue is not whether the survey could be improved” but
“whether, notwithstanding its limitations, the survey is nevertheless a
rational way for the PBGC to implement the stated goal of determining a
value that approximates the cost of a commercial annuity.”99 Nowhere did
the U.S. Airways court consider whether the use of annuity pricing was
consistent with the rationale for the regulation, or otherwise an appropriate
methodology for calculating UBL damages.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the U.S. Airways decision, in the
more than ten years since it was issued, several additional bankruptcy courts
have held that the Valuation Regulation controls in bankruptcy.100 These
decisions, however, have contained minimal, if any, analysis.101 Most
importantly, the question whether the Valuation Regulation is arbitrary and
capricious under the APA or Chevron102 is not addressed in any of these
99. Id. The U.S. Airways court also attempted to bolster its conclusion by noting that
“the statute defines ‘unfunded benefit liabilities’ as being the amount determined by reference
to the PBGC valuation regulation” and “[t]hat regulation was already in effect when the statute
was amended to its present form, and the court must therefore presume that Congress knew
and approved of the PBGC’s general methodology.” Id. at 796. This argument merely begs
the question, however, of what, if anything, Congress intended to ratify – the ACLI Surveybased methodology for determining the Annuity Interest factors (which factors are not part of
the Valuation Regulation except to the extent the rates that use such factors without
explanation appear in Appendix B to the regulation) or the objective of the Valuation
Regulation stated repeatedly by the PBGC over many years (which, as addressed in the next
section of this Article, is to approximate the PBGC’s own costs in providing pension benefits
to beneficiaries under terminated plans).
100. See, e.g., In re Durango Georgia Paper Co., No. 02-21669, 2017 WL 221785, at *3
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 2017); In re Wolverine, Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, 436 B.R. 253,
262-63 (D. Mass. 2010); Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes Inc.), 382 B.R. 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2008); United Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n (In re UAL Corp.), 346 B.R. 456
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); Order, In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., No. 05-10787 (Bankr. D.
Mass. July 27, 2006) [D.I. 2048]); In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 30,
2005) (Order and Trans. Of Hearing, Dec. 16, 2005, at 32-33).
101. There are cases in which the discount-rate issue was mentioned, but only in the
context of approving a settlement and therefore without reaching any determination on the
underlying substantive issue. See In re Wolverine, Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, 436 B.R. 253,
262-63 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing discount rate in the settlement context); In re Kaiser
Aluminum Corp., 339 B.R. 91, 96 (D. Del. 2006) (noting in settlement context that “in the
face of these complex and uncertain issues, it is difficult to envision who would succeed, but
not difficult to envision complex, costly and time-consuming litigation”); see also In re Sea
Containers, Ltd., No. 06-11156 (KJC), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2363, at *23 n. 9 (Bankr. D. Del.
Sept. 19, 2008).
102. In three of those decisions, the parties explicitly disclaimed any argument that the
Valuation Regulation was invalid outside of bankruptcy and instead relied exclusively on the
argument that a different rate should apply in bankruptcy as a matter of law. See Order and
Trans. Of Hearing, Dec. 16, 2005 at 33, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec.
30, 2005) (nothing that “neither the committee nor ALPA have argued that the regulations are
inapplicable or would not be used to determine the amount of United’s unfunded benefit
liabilities under applicable nonbankruptcy law”); In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., No. 05-
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decisions. None of the subsequent decisions has considered, examined or
even questioned the U.S. Airways court’s assumption regarding the rationale
for the Valuation Regulation.
III.

THE PBGC’S ANNUITY-BASED VALUATION REGULATION IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS STATED RATIONALE, AND IS THEREFORE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

While courts have mentioned briefly the APA and Chevron doctrine in
discussing the Valuation Regulation, none has given thoughtful
consideration to the analysis required under those rubrics. In particular, the
decision in U.S. Airways – and therefore the decisions following it – proceeds
from a fundamental misapprehension regarding the Valuation Regulation’s
history and purpose.
Central to the U.S. Airways analysis upholding the application of the
Valuation Regulation in bankruptcy was the court’s determination that “[t]he
stated goal of the regulation is to determine a value for the unfunded benefit
liabilities that approximates the cost of purchasing an annuity contract from
a commercial insurer that would pay the same benefits.”103 Though
acknowledging the ACLI Survey’s shortcomings, the court reasoned that
“notwithstanding its limitations, the survey is nevertheless a rational way for
the PBGC to implement the stated goal of determining a value that
approximates the cost of a commercial annuity.”104 The cases following U.S.
Airways have followed suit without questioning that premise.
As described more fully below, that basic premise is simply wrong:
contrary to the PBGCs more recent litigation stance, the stated goal of the
Valuation Regulation – as stated repeatedly in the Federal Register since
1975 – has never been to mirror annuity pricing for its own sake. Rather,
since 1975, the PBGC has consistently stated in its notice-and-comment
rulemakings that the rationale underlying (and thus purportedly justifying)
the Valuation Regulation is that the amount of the PBGC’s claim should
reflect the actual cost to the PBGC of providing the pension benefits for
10787, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 26, 2006) (stating that “the parties agreed to narrow
the initial issue for determination to whether this court should utilize the underlying
substantive law, namely the PBGC’s regulations, to determine the amount of its claim or
whether the Court should utilize a prudent investor approach advocated by the Chapter 11
Trustee”); Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes, Inc.), 382 B.R. 550, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008)
(stating that “[i]ndeed, the Liquidating Agent has not contended that outside of bankruptcy
and without obtaining a judgment invalidating PBGC’s regulations, Debtors could
successfully challenge the amount of PBGC’s claim solely on the ground that the claim is
excessive due to PBGC’s use of an inappropriate discount rate”).
103. 303 B.R. at 797.
104. Id. at 797.
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which it is assuming responsibility upon a plan’s termination. While the cost
to the PBGC of providing benefits could in theory mirror the cost of annuity
contracts – if the PBGC in fact purchased annuities – the reality is that it does
not do so. Even if the PBGC initially anticipated that it would buy annuities
or engage in investment practices comparable to insurance companies, the
PBGC has made no attempt to demonstrate why it would be the case that
annuity contracts would accurately reflect its own costs given its now
longstanding practice of investing in a diversified portfolio that does not
include annuities. Courts, in assessing whether the Valuation Regulation
applies in bankruptcy, have likewise failed to grapple with whether the
current Valuation Regulation’s use of annuity pricing bears any rational
relationship to the stated purpose of the regulation.
A. Legal Framework: Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review Requires
Courts to Consider a Regulation’s Purpose and Rationale
The APA states, in relevant part, that a reviewing court must “hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”105 The Chevron doctrine is a standard of statutory
interpretation that grew out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.106 The doctrine provides that
a court will defer to an agency’s interpretation of a federal statute that the
agency is charged with administering if the statute is silent or ambiguous on
the question at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.107 The
Court further explained that where Congress “has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill” and has expressly delegated authority to that agency to
legislate regulations accordingly, “[s]uch legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”108 Thus, in practice, there is likely to be little
difference between the analysis under Chevron versus the APA, as both call
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
106. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. Id. at 842-43. The Supreme Court has stated that the PBGC is an agency eligible for
Chevron deference when the PBGC’s interpretation is reasonable. See Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (noting that “[h]aving determined that the
PBGC’s construction is not contrary to clear congressional intent, we still must ascertain
whether the agency’s policy is based upon a ‘permissible’ construction of the statute, that is,
a construction that is ‘rational and consistent with the statute’”). There is an active
jurisprudential debate concerning Chevron itself and whether the effective delegation of
legislative authority to an agency under any circumstances is appropriate. This Article does
not take a position on that debate and tests the Valuation Regulation assuming that Chevron
remains good law.
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
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for an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review where Congress has
made an express delegation of rulemaking authority to the agency.109
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
requires that the agency examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.”110 The Supreme Court has
held that, in reviewing that explanation, the court must “consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.”111 An agency rule will generally
be found to be “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”112 Even if the agency can articulate a legitimate reason for a given
policy choice, its method of effectuating this policy choice must be rational
– if there is no rational relationship between an agency’s policy objective
and its approach, then the approach must be struck down as arbitrary and
capricious.113
In conducting this analysis, courts are generally limited to examining
the administrative record. The APA explicitly instructs a reviewing court to
look at the whole administrative record when deciding whether to set aside
agency action,114 and courts have consistently refused to consider an
agency’s “post hoc rationalizations” and litigation positions.115
109. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 n.7 (2011) (noting that its analysis pursuant
to the APA’s standard of judicial review would be the same if conducted under Chevron step
two, “because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary
or capricious in substance’”).
110. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
111. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
112. Id.; see also Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (holding the EPA’s
interpretation unreasonable under Chevron, because it did not take cost into account when
deciding whether it was appropriate to regulate power plants, and quoting State Farm for the
proposition that “agency action is only lawful when it rests on a consideration of the relevant
factors”).
113. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55, 64 (2011) (holding that courts must reverse
an agency rule “unmoored from the purposes and concerns” of the relevant statute and that an
agency must effectuate its policy choice in “some rational way” and “based on non-arbitrary,
relevant factors” (internal citations omitted)).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
115. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (noting that “we insist
that an agency examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action”); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting that
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Of some relevance here given that the Valuation Regulation was
originally promulgated in the 1970s, the Supreme Court has also explained
that the passage of time alone will not insulate a regulation from review.
Indeed, as the Court has explained, a “rule’s vintage” is a “slender reed to
support a significant government policy,” as “[a]rbitrary agency action
becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition.”116 On the other hand,
changes in agency policy also require justification.117
B. Rationale for the Valuation Regulation: The Discount Rate Should
Reflect the PBGC’s Actual Costs
The PBGC’s original notice in the Federal Register regarding the
proposed Valuation Regulation, which appeared on December 12, 1975,
stated that the rationale for the proposed regulation was that the interest rate
(and other assumptions) applied to the PBGC’s claim should reflect the
actual cost to the PBGC of providing the pension benefits:
General Approach. The value of a benefit as of the date of
termination is the current value of the cost that the PBGC normally
should incur as of the date of termination, in providing the benefit
under reasonable assumptions as to mortality, rates of retirement
when early retirement is possible, administrative expenses that will
be incurred, and investment return assumptions reflecting current
and longer term investment opportunities.
The PBGC’s
assumptions will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes
in market conditions and mortality assumptions.118
“Overton Park suggests that § 706(2)(A) . . . imposes a general ‘procedural’ requirement of
sorts by mandating that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that
will enable the court to evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision”); Florida Power
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (“If the record before the agency does
not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the
reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record
before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.”).
116. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 61.
117. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (holding that
“a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or
were engendered by the prior policy” and an “[u]nexplained inconsistency in agency policy
is a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency
practice” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
118. 40 Fed. Reg. 57982, 57982 (Dec. 12, 1975) (emphasis added). The PBGC went on
to add that “[t]he current value of plan benefits represents an estimate of costs to the PBGC,
not of costs to the plan sponsor.” Id. (emphasis added). In fact, the PBGC anticipated that
its cost of providing benefits would be lower – not higher – than the cost incurred by plan
sponsors. Id. (“In general, because the PBGC can pool the assets and liabilities of many
terminated plans for purposes of asset management, benefit administration and the purchase
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The implication of this general approach for interest rates was clear:
“To value benefits upon termination, interest assumptions should reflect
current market opportunities.”119 As of 1975, the PBGC apparently
contemplated that those “market opportunities” in which it would invest
would include the “purchase of annuities,” as stated in the preamble to the
original proposed rule.120 Indeed, when first announcing that it was using
interest rates derived from annuity price data in 1976,121 the PBGC explained
that the rationale for using annuity-based rates was to estimate the PBGC’s
actual costs: “the PBGC believes that the interest rate assumptions
underlying quotations for the purchase of large blocks of annuities from
private insurers provide the most reliable basis for estimating PBGC’s
expected investment experience.”122
In 1978, the PBGC went even further, specifically staking out the
position that the Annuity Interest Factors do not “overcharge” employers.
For example, in the course of responding to a public comment in 1978 that
the PBGC’s rates were “too low” relative to actual market conditions, i.e.,
relative to “the higher rates of yield for Standard & Poors (‘S&P’) long-term
government bonds and ‘AAA’ Industrial bonds,” the PBGC rejected the
suggestion that its regulatory rates in fact did, or were intended to, produce
a result materially different from the PBGC’s actual cost of providing the
benefits following plan termination.123 It stated:
The PBGC does not believe that the rates being established . . .
result in an “overcharge” to terminating plans. Section
4002(a)(1) of ERISA enjoins PBGC to carry out its functions
under Title IV so as to encourage the continuation of private
pension plans. To this end, the PBGC has sought to set rates that
will not encourage plan terminations and/or PBGC trusteeships.
On the other hand, the PBGC is also concerned that assessments
for employer liability not be greater than what PBGC expects it
will need to meet its guaranty liabilities for insufficient plans.
Thus, PBGC has adopted what it believes is a balanced approach
in setting its rates.124

of annuities, the PBGC’s projected costs in providing plan benefits should generally be less
than the costs that would be incurred by some individual plans themselves, especially very
small plans, which are expected to constitute a majority of terminating plans.”).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. (stating that “the PBGC can pool the assets and liabilities of many terminated
plans for purposes of asset management, benefit administration and the purchase of
annuities”).
121. 41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976).
122. 41 Fed. Reg. 48498, 48498 (Nov. 3, 1976) (emphasis added).
123. 43 Fed. Reg. 55240, 55240-41 (Nov. 27, 1978).
124. Id. at 55241.
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Two years later, in the context of proposing a method for publishing its
interest factors on a prospective rather than retrospective basis, the PBGC
again reaffirmed its cost-based rationale for setting those rates. Once again,
the PBGC made clear that “[t]he current value of a benefit as of a specific
date is equal to the amount of money needed on that date in order to be able
to pay the benefit over future years, taking into account reasonable and
current expectations as to the mortality, administrative expenses and interest
earnings (i.e., the rate of return to be earned on the investment of the
money).”125 While acknowledging, consistent with this premise, that
“[u]nder usual insurance practices, the interest rate assumption would be an
estimate of the rate of return to be earned during a future interval of time on
funds set aside to meet future benefit obligations,” the PBGC went on to say
that it “believes that its relatively brief period of investment experience is
neither sufficient nor necessarily an appropriate basis from which to project
future earnings.”126 In other words, the PBGC acknowledged and reaffirmed
the principle that the interest factors should be tied to the PBGC’s actual
costs, but stated that – as of 1980 – it lacked sufficient information to
estimate what those rates would be.
While the PBGC has been open about its use of annuity pricing, it has
never announced any change in this underlying cost-based rationale, and has
repeatedly reaffirmed it over the course of several decades, including
specifically restating that rationale verbatim in its 1993 rulemaking.127 It has
also consistently maintained its pledge to update the assumptions underlying
the Valuation Regulation as needed to mirror market realities.128
125. 45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980).
126. Id. The PBGC went on to add that, “[f]urther, the PBGC believes it would not be
appropriate for it to set rates which produce benefit values (annuity prices) that are
significantly different from the prices of annuities offered by private insurers. Accordingly,
PBGC will continue its practice of setting its interest rate and factors so as to produce benefit
values that are intended to be comparable to prices offered by private insurers.” Id.
127. 42 Fed. Reg. 2678, 2678 (Jan. 13, 1977) (“The valuation rates prescribed by the
PBGC are designed to reflect PBGC’s cost of providing benefits in terminating plans.”); 45
Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980) (“The current value of a benefit as of a specific date
is equal to the amount of money needed on that date in order to be able to pay the benefit over
future years, taking into account reasonable and current expectations as to the mortality,
administrative expenses and interest earnings (i.e., the rate of return to be earned on the
investment of the money).”); 58 Fed. Reg. 5128, 5128 (Jan. 19, 1993) (quoting the rationale
stated in the Dec. 12, 1975 proposed rulemaking). While PBGC has taken a more defensive
tone in its more recent Federal Register discussions of the Annuity Interest Factors after they
were successfully challenged in bankruptcy cases – stating in 2005 for example that the
“derived interest factors are not market interest rates” and “it is never meaningful to compare
PBGC’s interest factors to market interest rates,” 48 Fed. Reg. 12429, 12430 (Mar. 14, 2005),
– it has never explicitly recanted its original cost-based rationale for the regulation, much less
attempted to provide any official justification for doing so.
128. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 57982, 57982 (Dec. 12, 1975) (“The PBGC’s assumptions
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C. The Valuation Regulation Overstates the PBGC’s UBL Claim and
Does Not Reflect the PBGC’s Actual Costs
As noted above, the PBGC has long embraced an investment strategy
based on “prudent” risk taking, under the direction of professional money
managers. The result of this approach has been annual returns that, on
average, significantly outpace the rate of return implicit in the PBGC’s
Annuity Interest Factors. In other words, since the PBGC uses a
sophisticated investment strategy to maximize its returns on its assets, the
Annuity Interest Factors do not reflect the PBGC’s actual cost in providing
the pension benefits for a terminated plan.
This can be seen by examining the PBGC’s annual returns as reflected
in its annual reports. As shown below in Table 1, the annual rates of return
reported by the PBGC in the annual reports available on its website for the
years 1995 through 2016 vary by year (including some negative returns
during economic downturns) but average 8.23% when considering annual
returns, or 8.35% when looking at the 5-year average return reported in each
Annual Report during that period. Under either measure, the PBGC’s
average rate of return is over 8%, and well in excess of the discount rates
generally dictated by the Annuity Interest Factors, such as the 5.25% longterm discount rate the PBGC argued for in U.S. Airways. It is also important
to note that the figures in Table 1 reflect the PBGC’s earnings from both its
trust fund and its revolving fund assets. Looking at the trust fund assets
alone, the returns are generally higher, owing to the lack of statutory
constraints on investment approach. Indeed, the court in U.S. Airways found
that “reported returns on the PBGC’s trust fund assets over the 18-year
period from 1985 through 2002 are approximately 10% on an annual

will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes in market conditions and mortality
experience.”); id. at 58008 (“The interest rates and intervals of deferment contained in this
Appendix will be amended by the PBGC from time to time to reflect changes in market
conditions.”); 41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976) (“The PBGC intends to be
monitoring the interest assumptions periodically, and will review the mortality assumptions
when data is available. The assumptions will be changed when appropriate.”); 43 Fed. Reg.
55240, 55240 (Nov. 27, 1978) (“The interest rates and factors set forth in the regulation must
be adjusted periodically to reflect changes in investment markets. . . . Because these rates and
factors must be reflective of investment experience, it is necessary to update the rates and
factors periodically.”); 44 Fed. Reg. 3971, 3971 (Jan. 19, 1979) (expressing the same); 45
Fed. Reg. 82172, 82172 (Dec. 15, 1980) (stating that “the interest rates and factors set forth
in the regulation are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in financial and annuity
markets”); 46 Fed. Reg. 26765, 26766 (May 15, 1981) (“The interest rates and factors set
forth in Appendix B to Part 2610 are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in financial and
annuity markets.”); 58 Fed. Reg. 5128, 5128 (Jan. 19, 1993) (quoting original 1975 statement
that “[t]he PBGC’s assumptions will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes in
market conditions and mortality experience”).
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basis.”129
Table 1: Annual and Five-Year Average Returns Reported by the
PBGC, 1995-2016
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Average

Annual Return
(Percentage)
24.1
8.5
21.9
14.4
3.6
13.2
-3.3
2.1
10.3
8.0
8.9
4.2
7.2
-6.5
13.2
12.1
5.1
12.6
2.6
8.0
0.1
10.8
8.23

Five-Year Average Return
(Percentage)
15.5
12.3
14.4
11.9
14.2
12.1
9.6
5.8
5.0
5.9
5.1
6.7
7.7
4.2
5.2
5.8
6.0
7.1
9.0
8.0
5.6
6.7
8.35

129. In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). Note that
while the analysis in this Article, and in Table 1 in particular, was performed and initially
made public prior to the release of the PBGC’s 2017 Annual Report, the inclusion of data
from the 2017 Annual Report would not materially alter the conclusions reached here. See
2017 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 12 (reporting annual rate of return of 5.6%,
or 5.4% over a five-year period).
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THE PBGC’S POST HOC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE VALUATION
REGULATION DO NOT SUPPORT IT

The foregoing demonstrates that the PBGC’s current annuity-based
Valuation Regulation cannot be squared with – much less justified by – the
official cost-based rationale for the Valuation Regulation found in the
Federal Register. Perhaps recognizing this disconnect between the
regulation’s rationale and the PBGC’s desire to charge sponsors of
terminating plans at an annuity rate, the PBGC has, in responding to legal
challenges to the Valuation Regulation, attempted to recast the rationale for
the Valuation Regulation.
This recasting is perhaps best summarized in a 2013 white paper
published on the PBGC website, titled “Derivation of Interest Factors in
PBGC’s Liability Valuation Methodology” (the “White Paper”).130 The
White Paper, which has not been published in the Federal Register or made
subject to official public commentary, states that its “purpose” “is to describe
the rationale for the PBGC’s liability valuation methodology and regulation
particularly as it relates to the determination and application of interest
factors.”131 While the White Paper does not constitute the official rationale
for the Valuation Regulation, which – as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
explained132 – is to be found solely in the official administrative record, it is
worth considering the arguments raised by the PBGC in the White Paper,
which mirror the position the PBGC has taken, and likely will continue to
take, in litigation (and which position has been accepted by bankruptcy
courts since 2003).133
In contrast to the official explanation found in the Federal Register,
which was based on the cost to the PBGC, the White Paper asserts that
“[f]rom the outset, the cornerstone of the PBGC regulatory approach has
been to value a plan’s benefit liabilities by approximating the fair market
price of group annuities sold by private sector insurance companies.”134 The
White Paper states that the “rationale for valuing liabilities based on their
market value is twofold”:
130. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17.
131. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 1 (emphasis added).
132. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (explaining that the official
rationale for a regulation is found in the administrative record).
133. In its Pre-Trial Brief in U.S. Airways, the PBGC stated that it would “prove that its
claim is the marketplace value of the Pilots Plan’s liabilities, less the value of the Pilots Plan’s
assets,” on the basis that the “PBGC’s determination of the unfunded benefit liabilities of the
Pilots Plan is well within the range of what insurance companies would charge.” Pre-Trial
Brief of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation at 28, In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No.
02-83984 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2003).
134. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added).
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First, this valuation approach minimizes the “moral hazard”
inherent in the Title IV termination insurance program by ensuring
that it is not less costly for an employer to terminate a pension plan
in a distress termination with the PBGC than to terminate the plan
in a standard termination in the private sector. Marking liabilities
in PBGC-trusteed plans to the annuity market matches those
liabilities to the price that a plan sponsor would have to pay to
terminate their plan in the open market. This avoids the moral
hazard mentioned above as well as the clear impropriety of
overpricing PBGC’s trusteeship of a sponsor’s pension plan.
Second, the regulation is premised on the rationale that valuing a
liability based on the value a willing buyer and seller would
exchange for that liability – i.e., a market value obtained in a
competitive marketplace – is reasonable.135
Each of these arguments is addressed in turn below.
A. Annuity Pricing Is Not Necessary to Avoid Any “Moral Hazard”

The so-called “moral hazard” cited by the PBGC appears to be a
reference to the fact that in a standard termination an employer “can
complete the standard termination by distributing plan assets in the form of
annuities purchased from a private insurer.”136 Though not stated explicitly,
the PBGC’s argument seems to be that, were it to use a higher discount rate
reflecting its actual investment experience, plan sponsors would elect to
engage in distress terminations rather than standard terminations. There are
at least two flaws in this argument.
First, as a threshold matter, the PBGC’s focus on the purchase of
annuities for a standard termination is misplaced, as a standard termination
may, but need not be, accomplished by the purchase of annuities. Rather, by
statute, a standard termination can also be accomplished by means of lump
sum payments to participants,137 which in general constitutes a cheaper
alternative to the purchase of annuities since insurance companies that offer
annuities must account for the risk they take on in selling those products, and
is in fact the alternative taken by a large percentage of eligible retirees when
135. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 2-3.
136. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 8 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i); 29 C.F.R. §
4041.28(c)(2)). Section 1341(b) provides under “Methods of final distribution of assets” in a
standard termination that “[i]n distributing such assets, the plan administrator shall – (i)
purchase irrevocable commitments from an insurer to provide all benefit liabilities under the
plan, or (ii) in accordance with the provisions of the plan and any applicable regulations,
otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan. A transfer of assets to the
corporation in accordance with section 1350 of this title on behalf of a missing participant
shall satisfy this subparagraph with respect to such participant.”
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3).
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given the option.138
Second, and more fundamentally, the purported choice between a
standard and a distress termination that underlies the supposed “moral
hazard” simply is not available. As the PBGC itself acknowledges in the
White Paper, an employer may voluntarily terminate an “underfunded plan
only if the employer and each member of the controlled group meet one of
ERISA’s tests for financial ‘distress.’”139 None of these tests involves or
references annuities; rather, they turn on the financial health of the plan
sponsor.140 Thus, there is no clear “moral hazard” inherent in discounting
UBL claims according to the PBGC’s rate of return on its investments, given
that employers are not at liberty to select a distress termination merely
because they believe it will be more advantageous than a standard
termination or continuation of the plan.
Indeed, to the extent the PBGC was expressing a concern related to the
ability of a plan sponsor to terminate a pension plan absent financial distress,
this concern is no longer relevant since Congress amended ERISA in 1986
and 1987 to provide that an employer may only voluntarily terminate a plan
where it can be shown that either the plan had sufficient assets to cover
liabilities or where the employer met the standard for financial distress.141
The amendments implemented in 1986-87 were designed to correct the
perceived effect the then-existing system had of “encourag[ing] employers
to terminate plans, evade their obligations to pay benefits and shift unfunded
pension liabilities to the insurance program.”142 Thus, the goal was “to
increase the likelihood that participants will receive their full benefits, to
138. Testimony of Craig Rosenthal on Behalf of the American Benefits Council for the
ERISA Advisory Council: Private-Sector De-Risking and Participant Protections at 4 (June
5, 2013), available at https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/?id=e6140ac6-f0b9af44-18d0-471154b3b649 [https://perma.cc/L49R-RAHV] (stating “[a]nnuities come at a
cost to the plan sponsor though, as the cost of purchasing an annuity is almost universally
higher than the cost of offering lump sums” and that “[t]his increased cost is primarily the
result of margins imposed by the insurer to cover potential adverse risks, profits, taxes and
other expenses”). According to Rosenthal, onetime lump-sum offers, including offers in
connection with a plan terminations, experience an election percentage for participants who
have not yet commenced benefits in the range of 40 to 60%. Id. at 6.
139. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
140. Under ERISA, an employer may voluntarily terminate a pension plan due to financial
distress only if one of four tests is satisfied: (1) the employer is in liquidation proceedings, (2)
the employer is in reorganization proceedings and termination is needed for the success of the
reorganization, (3) without termination, an employer will be unable to meet obligations in
order to continue in business, or (4) costs of the plan have become “unreasonably
burdensome” due to declining workforce. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B).
141. Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 237 (1986); Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (part of
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987).
142. H.R. REP. No. 99-300, at 312 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 756, 963.
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limit claims against the PBGC insurance system to instances of severe
hardship and to assure that the program is prudently financed.”143 Prior to
the amendments, Congress determined that plan sponsors’ “lack of full
statutory accountability to participants, beneficiaries, and the PBGC
provides a disincentive for employers to fully fund their pension plans and
can result in a funding shortfall that threatens both benefit security and the
fiscal solvency of the PBGC.”144 By enacting these changes, Congress hoped
to create a situation where “[p]articipants and beneficiaries and the PBGC
will incur losses from a plan termination only when the contributing sponsor
and the other members of its controlled group are so financially distressed
that they cannot pay the full liability that the bill would impose.”145 Thus,
Congress has already addressed the “moral hazard” issue and there is no
credible argument that use of annuity pricing relates to, or can be justified
by, a moral hazard risk.
B. The Annuity Interest Factors Do Not Reflect a “Market Price” for
the PBGC’s Insurance Coverage
The PBGC also argues for the use of its Annuity Interest Factors based
“on the rationale that valuing a liability based on the value a willing buyer
and willing seller would exchange for that liability – i.e., a market value
obtained in a competitive marketplace – is reasonable.”146 This rationale
sounds appealing superficially because it suggests that the PBGC is
estimating how the market might value the coverage of the pension
obligations provided by the PBGC. But the PBGC’s rationale mixes “apples
with oranges” in the sense that what the market is pricing with the Annuity
Interest Factors are annuities offered by life insurance companies (a product
that the PBGC does not buy, nor can it provide), whereas what is actually
being provided by the PBGC is a commitment to cover the future pension
obligations using earnings generated from PBGC assets. The two are not the
same. The PBGC would never find a willing buyer for its coverage at the
“price” implied by the Annuity Interest Factors because the PBGC follows
an investment strategy and has a capital position that are very different from
life insurance companies.
When an actual annuity contract is sold by a private insurance company,
the purchaser pays a lump-sum price for the contract in exchange for a
promise from the insurance company, as seller, to pay a fixed amount of cash
on a monthly basis to a set of beneficiaries over a given period; for example,
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 109 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1.
Id. at 125.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 3.
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until the death of each of the beneficiaries. Life insurance companies are
well-capitalized financial institutions that invest the proceeds from their
annuity sales in relatively low-risk, fixed income assets.147 This is the reason
that the implied discount rates from the insurance companies are so low: the
assets used to pay the annuities over time are invested in low-risk assets with
low rates of return.
In contrast, according to its own stated investment policy, the PBGC
does not follow a low-risk/low return investment strategy. For instance, in
its 2008 Annual Report, the PBGC stated that one of the objectives of its
current investment policy was to “prudently maximize investment
returns.”148 PBGC director Charles Millard acknowledged the risk profile of
the PBGC’s strategy, stating that “[t]he PBGC has the ability to accept some
degree of short-term volatility to achieve our goal of enhancing assets to pay
benefits.”149 The PBGC, as well as other U.S. government agencies, have on
multiple occasions recognized the risks inherent in the PBGC investment
program. For example, the PBGC’s 2009 Annual Report declares that its
financial health is subject to “market risk associated with interest rates and
equity returns” because these factors affect the value of PBGC’s assets.150
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) designated the PBGC
single employer program as “high-risk” in July 2003 and added the
multiemployer program in January 2009.151 These programs still remain on
the GAO’s high-risk list due to “long-term structural challenges relating to
funding of defined benefit pension plans.”152 Finally, the U.S. Government
does not stand behind the PBGC’s obligations and funds from general tax
revenues are not provided to the PBGC to carry out its mandate.153
The differences between the PBGC and life insurance companies
become apparent when examining the asset holdings of the institutions. As

147. Robert McMenamin et al. What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In?, Chicago Fed Letter,
No. 309, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Apr. 2013.
148. 2008 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 18. This objective has been repeated
in subsequent investment policy statements. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC
INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT, May 2011 (stating that “[p]rudent risk-taking is
justifiable”); PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 4, Sep.
2016 (same).
149. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Announces New Investment Policy, Feb. 18,
2008, available at https://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr08-19 [https://perma.cc/YV
Q7-SB5Y].
150. 2009 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 22.
151. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES, AN UPDATE 150, Feb.
2011.
152. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 20-21.
153. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Announces New Investment Policy, Feb. 18,
2008, available at https://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr08-19 [https://perma.cc/94K
Z-VSPJ].
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stated in its 2016 Investment Policy Statement, the PBGC aims for a 70/30
ratio of fixed-income to equity assets.154 As of 2016, the PBGC was roughly
on track to meet this objective, with approximately 67.6% of its assets in
fixed-income securities, 28.0% in equities, and the remainder in other
investments such as real estate and private equity.155 By contrast, insurance
companies, which are constrained by state laws and regulations concerning
their investments,156 as well as the practical need to meet long-term
obligations, invest primarily in fixed-income assets such as corporate bonds
and mortgages.157 As of year-end 2015, for example, 70.1% of life insurer
general account assets were held in bonds, with corporate bonds alone
constituting nearly half of all assets, while only 2.2% of assets were in stocks
and 10.3 in mortgages (the remainder was comprised of real estate, and other
investments).158 Thus, compared to the life insurers, the PBGC holds a much
larger proportion of its investments in relatively risky equities and a smaller
proportion in lower risk fixed-income and other debt securities. While the
large weight of the PBGC’s allocation in equities generates higher average
returns for the PBGC, it comes with a commensurate level of risk not
embraced by insurances companies.
The PBGC and insurance companies also differ in their capital
positions, i.e., the difference between the value of assets and liabilities. As
noted in its 2016 Annual Report, for FY 2016 the PBGC’s Single Employer
Program reported approximately $97.3 million in assets and $117.9 million
in liabilities, for a deficit of approximately $20.6 billion (i.e., roughly 17%

154. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 5, Sept.
2016.
155. 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP 68 (reporting $57,292 million in fixed
maturity securities, $23,684 million in equity securities, and $84,732 million in total assets,
in each case by market value).
156. NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS., CONSUMER PROTECTION
COMPARISON: THE FEDERAL PENSION SYSTEM AND THE STATE INSURANCE SYSTEM 17, May
22, 2016 (noting that “state insurance commissioners heavily regulate and closely monitor
life insurer investments,” which must generally be made up of “highly rated, investment grade
debt obligations” and that “life insurers are generally restricted from investing in the aggregate
more than 20% of their admitted assets in equities listed on a qualified exchange, or more than
5% in the aggregate in equities of unaffiliated entities not listed on a qualified exchange”).
157. See Robert McMenamin et al. What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In?, Chicago Fed
Letter, No. 309, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Apr. 2013 (noting that “fixed-income
assets like bonds and mortgages constituted the largest share of invested assets, at 75.5% and
9.6%, respectively,” with corporate bonds alone making up “the largest share of generalaccount assets” at 46.0%,” while equities constituted only 2.3%).
158. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2016 11. Note that these
figures exclude assets held in separate accounts for liabilities associated with investment risk
pass-through products, such as variable annuities or variable life insurance, id. at 7, 11, which
are not the focus here.
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of liabilities).159 By comparison, insurance companies are required, subject
to regulatory oversight, to maintain assets in excess of insurance
obligations.160 As of 2015, the vast majority of insurance companies had a
risk-based capital ratio – the excess of assets over the minimum amount
needed to avoid triggering regulatory action – of 200% or greater, with an
average ratio of 486%.161 In other words, insurance companies generally
carry well in excess of twice the required level of assets. The positive capital
positions of the life insurers provide them with an extra “equity cushion”
against any losses on their assets.
There are other important differences, too. As noted by the GAO, the
PBGC differs from insurance companies in that (1) it is unable to set the
level of premiums that it receives from plan sponsors to insure their plans,
and (2) it must take on new participants, irrespective of the financial health
of the terminated plans.162
Given the PBGC’s stated investment goals of prudent risk-taking, as
well as its portfolio holdings and capital position, which together imply an
explicitly higher risk and return strategy, the PBGC cannot duplicate the low
risk and return profile implied by annuity contracts offered by life insurance
companies. The only “market” rate that the PBGC could use to discount
pension obligations would have to be higher than the Annuity Interest
Factors in order to reflect the realities of the PBGC’s investment strategy and
capital position. Therefore, when the PBGC uses its Annuity Interest Factors
to discount pension obligations, it understates the discount rate, which leads
the present value of the obligations to be overstated.
Moreover, even when the PBGC is permitted to collect an oversized
claim based on its Annuity Interest Factors, it is still unable to offer a risk159. See 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 28. As noted, supra note 9, the
PBGC again reported substantial deficits in 2017. See 2017 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.
ANN. REP. 10 (reporting.$10.9 billion deficit for the single-employer program and $65.1
billion deficit for the multiemployer program). Although there is arguably some circularity
in assessing the PBGC’s deficit on the basis of its Annual Reports, which similarly use
artificially low discount rates, there is little disputing that the PBGC is poorly capitalized
relative to most insurance companies.
160. See generally NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS., CONSUMER
PROTECTION COMPARISON: THE FEDERAL PENSION SYSTEM AND THE STATE INSURANCE
SYSTEM 16-17, May 22, 2016.
161. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2016 25, 30. To provide
another metric, in 2015, the aggregate capital ratio of U.S. life insurers (defined as surplus
funds plus capital stock plus asset valuation reserve as a percentage of general account assets)
was 10.7%. Id. at 24.
162. GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 7. The GAO also noted that although the
PBGC has adjusted its investment policy several times over the years, these “frequent changes
in policy have had a moderate impact on PBGC’s actual allocation of assets since 1976
because there were no allocation targets in place prior to 1990 and the policy targets after that
time were rarely ever met.”
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free benefit given its asset allocation practices and capital position. Any
amount the PBGC recovers through its UBL claim, together with the
earnings from the plan assets that the PBGC inherits, is invested according
to the PBGC’s investment policy and alongside the PBGC’s other assets as
part of the total mix of assets available to the PBGC to meet obligations for
all trusteed plans. As a result, a higher claim amount does not guarantee (or
nearly guarantee) that all the pension obligations will be paid when they
come due; the overstated amounts are still subject to the same risks inherent
in PBGC’s aggregate investment portfolio.163
To be sure, if the PBGC starts with an overstated amount with which to
invest, the expected dollar return on those amounts will more than cover the
pension obligations for a given pension plan in isolation. Indeed, the PBGC
would expect to earn a surplus above what is owed on the pension
obligations. This surplus would benefit the PBGC by potentially
strengthening its financial position, albeit at the cost of reducing the claim
amounts available to other creditors. But even providing the PBGC with an
overstated claim would not be sufficient to guarantee the pension obligations
it has taken on for any given plan. In order for the PBGC to provide
terminated pension plans with the same level of certainty of future benefit
payments that private insurance companies can provide, it would need to
fundamentally alter how it operates. In theory, the PBGC could buy
annuities from private insurance companies for plan participants.164 The
PBGC could also change its investment allocation practices to be consistent
with private sector insurance companies. To date, neither of these steps has
been taken, however, nor has the PBGC indicated any intention to make such
changes, to the extent it could do so. Therefore, the PBGC cannot provide
trusteed plans with the certainty offered by private insurance companies and
implied in the Annuity Interest Factors. The PBGC may wish to charge plan
sponsors for offering that level of certainty, but it simply cannot offer it. It
currently charges for something that it does not provide, and cannot provide.
In light of the forgoing, it becomes clear that the more appropriate rate
for discounting UBL claims is the expected return on the PBGC portfolio.
Only by discounting the pension obligations at the expected return on the
PBGC portfolio can one appropriately match “apples to apples” – using the
PBGC’s expected investment return as a discount rate that reflects the ability
of the PBGC to generate a return based on its own investment risk and return
163. Given its capital position, the only way for the PBGC to provide a (nearly) risk-free
benefit is to invest in (nearly) risk-free assets.
164. In theory, Congress could set premiums charged to non-terminated pension plans
such that the revenue would pay for the difference between the cost of the annuities purchased
and the amount of assets recovered from terminated pension plans and their plan sponsors.
Congress has not done so.
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profile to meet the payments under the pension obligations.
While it may have made some sense initially for the PBGC to use
Annuity Interest Factors to estimate the cost that the PBGC would incur in
providing benefits – indeed, the PBGC may have envisioned that it would in
fact purchase annuities – that is no longer the case. As discussed above, it
appears that the PBGC initially used annuity contracts to estimate PBGC
investment returns because, through September 1976, the PBGC maintained
an asset mix that was similar to insurance companies.165 However, beginning
in late 1976 and thereafter, the PBGC deviated from the low-risk and lowreturn profile of life insurance companies by increasing its investment in
equities.166 But the PBGC failed to divorce itself from the use of annuity
prices to calculate its discount rates. By 1980, the PBGC defended its
continued use of life annuities to infer discount rates in place of its actual
investment returns by suggesting that it did not yet have sufficient
investment return information to switch to a different discount rate.167 The
PBGC also began to argue that discounting at rates higher than those implied
by life annuity contracts – even if the higher rates more accurately reflected
the PBGC’s investment profile – could provide incentives for on-going plans
to terminate,168 a purported concern that is no longer relevant in light of
subsequent amendments to ERISA providing that plan sponsors may not
voluntarily terminate defined-benefit pension plans absent financial
distress.169 The PBGC no doubt came to appreciate over time the fact that
its continued use of Annuity Interest Factors is hugely beneficial to its
bottom line, effectively allowing it to pursue claims that yield recoveries far
in excess of recoveries that would be generated by claims premised on a costbased damages approach. Thus, while the PBGC rulemaking originally

165. In November 1976, the PBGC wrote that it “believes that the interest rate
assumptions underlying quotations for the purchase of large blocks of annuities from private
insurers provide the most reliable basis for estimating PBGC’s expected investment
experience.” 41 Fed. Reg. 48498 (Nov. 3, 1976). Meanwhile, “[t]he PBGC Total Fund
allocation in September 1976 (the beginning of the historical sample period) was similar to
that found among life insurance companies,” GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 54.
166. The “period (September 1976 to August 1987) was characterized by a trend of
allocation away from bonds into equities such that the allocation altered from 15 percent
equities, 84 percent bonds in September 1976 to 64 percent equities, 31 percent bonds by
August 1987.” GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 53.
167. “Under usual insurance practices, the interest rate assumption would be an estimate
of the rate of return to be earned during a future interval of time on funds set aside to meet
future benefit obligations. The PBGC believes that its relatively brief period of investment
experience is neither sufficient nor necessarily an appropriate basis from which to project
future earnings.” 45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980).
168. “To this end, the PBGC has sought to set rates that will not encourage plan
terminations and/or PBGC trusteeships.” 43 Fed. Reg. 55240, 55241 (Nov. 27, 1978).
169. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
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intended that future benefit obligations be discounted at rates that reflected
the PBGC’s investment performance, the PBGC froze in place its use of
annuity contracts to infer discount rates, thus defaulting on its commitment
to update the assumptions as necessary to reflect the PBGC’s actual costs.
CONCLUSION
The current state of the law with respect to the Valuation Regulation is
untenable. The Valuation Regulation is in conflict with its own rationale,
and is also in significant tension with the bedrock principles of bankruptcy
law that form the context in which the PBGC’s UBL claims are litigated. As
argued herein, the conflict between the PBGC’s Valuation Regulation and
its own rationale should lead courts to the conclusion that the regulation is
arbitrary and capricious, and not entitled to any deference in determining the
appropriate discount rate for the PBGC’s UBL claims – in bankruptcy or
otherwise.
There are two basic roads to reform. First, the PBGC can revise its
methodology for devising the discount rates used in the Valuation
Regulation. This would not require a major overhaul of the regulation itself,
which only uses the Annuity Interest Factors as one of several components
in determining the UBL claim amount. Indeed, the PBGC has repeatedly
stated that the assumptions underlying the computation of its UBL claim
amount will be updated in the future as necessary to more accurately reflect
market conditions. As demonstrated herein, the time for the PBGC to make
such an amendment to its interest factors is long overdue.
Second, if the PBGC is not prepared to revise the Valuation Regulation,
Congress should act. If it were truly Congress’s intention that the PBGC be
granted an outsized claim in bankruptcy to the detriment of other unsecured
creditors, so be it. But Congress has never so indicated, notwithstanding the
PBGC’s insistence that Congress has “ratified” the current Valuation
Regulation. If, on the other hand, Congress did not intend for the PBGC to
exercise advantages over other similarly situated creditors in bankruptcy –
besides those it expressly granted to the PBGC in providing that it could
recover from any member of a plan sponsor’s controlled group – then a
clarifying amendment to ERISA mandating a cost-based approach to
discounting the PBGC’s UBL claim would have a salutary effect, bringing
both greater clarity and fairness to bankruptcy proceedings to which the
PBGC is a party.
Finally, if neither road to reform is pursued, courts have ample basis
today to reject UBL claims based on the PBGC’s annuity-pricing-derived
discount rates. Congress provided the PBGC with enormous benefits
through joint-and-several controlled group liability. It did not provide the
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PBGC with authorization to use an arbitrary and capricious discount rate to
outsize its UBL claims.

